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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
OATHS AS TO PAST, PRESENT, AND
FUTURE LOYALTY
The oath upon taking public office is a basic and respected feature of
our American political philosophy. This oath includes a pledge to support
the Constitution of the United States, and to support the particular state
laws. An oath as to present and future loyalty is constitutionally' and
morally right, since reasonable men cannot deny that the duties of al-
legiance to the United States and support of the Constitution are inherent
in citizenship. 2 These oaths required of public employees as to their
present and future loyalty have not often been contested, but when the
issue has come before the courts, their constitutionality has been upheld. 3
Today, the United States is facing shrewd and powerful enemies. Its
survival depends upon the means by which it protects itself, and it is
clear that infiltration of the governments of the free peoples with sub-
versives functioning as effective fifth columns is an integral part of the
plans of our enemies.
In the face of this grave challenge, our government must fully protect
itself from its enemies engaged in internal espionage. This may be ac-
complished by swift and efficient police work provided for by existing
state and federal legislation. 4 However, mainly because of uncertainty,
ignorance of foreign affairs, and a popular mass hysteria, we have sought
the panacea to our feeling of insecurity in loyalty oaths. The undisci-
plined public demand for a wholesale method of protecting the govern-
ment from internal espionage has manifested itself in a "national network
of laws aimed at coercing and controlling the minds of men."5 These
laws have taken the form of the respected and highly regarded loyalty
oaths.
There has been a movrement in recent years to require an oath of
loyalty from all government employees, and such demand has been aimed
1 The Constitution only requires oaths by the President, Article 2, § 1, and by
Congress, Article 6. However, other oaths are not prohibited, except religious oaths.
2 18 A.L.R. 2d 241 (1951); see McCready v. Hunt, 20 S.C.L. 1 (1834) concerning
the dual aspect of American citizenship.
a 18 A.L.R. 2d 304 (1951).
4111. Rev. Stat. (1949) c. 38, S 558; 62 Stat. 808, S 2385 (1948); 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 2385 (1950). "Whoever organizes or helps to organize any society, group, or as-
sembly of persons who teach, advocate, or encourage the overthrow or destruction
of any such government by force or violence; or becomes or is a member of or
affiliates with, any such society, group, or assembly of persons, knowing the pur-
pose thereof . . .shall be fined not more than $10,000.00 or imprisoned not more
than ten years, or both ......
\Vieman v. Updegraff, 73 S. Ct. 215, 220 (1952).
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especially at school teachers. 6 These loyalty oaths usually require the
government employee to file an affidavit stating that he is loyal and not
a member of any subversive organization. The lawfulness of oaths per-
taining to one's present and future loyalty have been readily upheld by
the courts.7 It is those loyalty oaths which require the taker of the oath
to swear to his past loyalty which have been attacked most bitterly and
which are our primary concern. This comment is limited to the field of
loyalty oaths required of public employees by the state governments.
Retrospective "test oath" provisions requiring an oath of past allegiance
and loyalty, had their beginning in American history during the time of
the Civil War." Their purpose, at inception, was to exclude persons who
supported the Confederacy during the war from certain activities. How-
ever, the United States Supreme Court held unconstitutional the require-
ment of an oath of past loyalty, ordained by the Missouri Constitution
as a prerequisite to the pursuance of various vocations. The case involved
an application of the requirement to bar a Roman Catholic priest from
teaching and preaching. 9 Such provisions were held to be bills of attainder
and ex post facto laws, which barred the pursuance of one of the ordinary
vocations of life, and were thus prohibited by the Constitution of the
United States.10
In recent times, these same retrospective loyalty oath provisions, in
which one's past as well as present affiliations are within the realm of
disclosure, have been held to be constitutional." State oaths sometimes
require the affiant to swear (or affirm) that he or she has not been a
member of any subversive organization for a stated period of time.
12
6 For 4 sound and stimulating discussion of the problem as to school teachers, see:
Marshall, Defense of Public Education from Subversion, 51 Col. L. Rev. 587
(1951).
7 18 A.L.R. 2d 304 (1951).
s For a complete history of oaths in general, see Imbrie v. Marsh, 3 N.J. 578, 71
A. 2d 352 (1950).
9 Cummings v. The State of Missouri, 4 Wall 277 (1866).
10Cf. Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall 333 (1866); U.S. Constitution provides "No Bill
of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed." Art. 1, § 9; Art. 1, § 10, "No
state .. . shall pass any Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law . . ."; on bill of
attainder, see 90 L. Ed. 1267.
11Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952); Gerende v. Election Board,
341 U.S. 56 (1951); Garner v. Los Angeles Board, 341 U.S. 716 (1951); Parker v.
County of Los Angeles, 337 U.S. 929 (1949).
12 Typical example is 1 Deering's Calif. Code on Govt., p. 188 (1951), § 3103
(Levering Act). ". . . that within the five years immediately preceding the taking
of this oath (or affirmation) I have not been a member of any party or organization,
political or otherwise, that advocated the overthrow of the Government of the
United States or of the State of California by force or violence or other unlawful
means, except as follows: .. " Upholding constitutionality, see Pockman v. Leonard,
249 P. 2d 267 (Calif., 1952).
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Today, in spite of strong arguments that legislation requiring such
oaths is legislation providing for bills of attainder or ex post facto laws,
and thus within the prohibitory clauses of the federal Constitution, the
constitutionality of such legislation has been upheld. The courts, in up-
holding such legislation, state that the oath requirements do not fall
before the weight of these arguments, for the reason that no punishment
is provided for failure to take the oath. They state that the oaths are mere
regulation of standards of qualification and eligibility for employment.'8
The argument that such oath requirements impair the constitutional right
to contract 14 has been held not to apply to parties dealing with a depart-
ment of government. 15
A few recent cases, however, seem to show a limit as to the amount of
discretion the states will be allowed under the Constitution. Garner v.
Los Angeles Board6 involved a Los Angeles ordinance requiring all city
employees to swear that they had neither in the past advocated the over-
throw of the government by unlawful means nor belonged to any organ-
ization with such objectives. The attacks on the oath, proposing that it
violates due process because its negation is not limited to organizations
known by the employee to be within the proscribed class, were held
invalid because the court assumed that scienter by the affiant was implied
in the statute.
The oath in Gerende v. Election Board 7 was required of candidates
for public office. This legislation was interpreted by the Maryland Court
of Appeals as requiring that the affiant was not knowingly engaged in
an attempt to overthrow the government by force or violence or was
a member of an organization engaged in the promotion of such an end.
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision on the grounds that scienter
was again implied because of the interpretation given to the statute by
the state court.'8
The furthest the Supreme Court has gone in upholding retrospective
loyalty oaths is in Adler v. Board of Education9 in which membership
in an organization found to be subversive by the Board of Regents was
regarded as prima facie evidence of disqualification to continue in a
'I Thompson v. Wallin, 301 N.Y. 476, 95 N.E. 2d 806 (1950).
14 U.S. Const. Art. 1, S 10.
15 Chicago, B. & Q. Railroad v. Nebraska, 170 U.S. 57 (1898); Board of Education
v. Phillips, 67 Kan. 549, 73 Pac. 97 (1903).
16341 U.S. 716 (1951); 38 A.B.A.J. 61 (1952); 50 Mich. L. Rev. 467 (1952); 29
Chi-Kent Rev. 255 (1951).
17 341 U.S. 56 (1951). This case was noted in 37 A.B.A.J. 604 (1951).
18 Wieman v. Updegraff, 73 S. Ct. 215, 218 (1952).
19342 U.S. 716 (1952), noted in 38 A.B.A.J. 924 (1952); 66 Harv. L. Rev. 95-97,
111-112, 121 (1952); 100 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1244 (1952).
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teaching position.2 0 The basic reason for allowing such statutes is the
hornbook law proposition that there is no constitutional right to a gov-
ernment job. In other words, as Justice Holmes succinctly put it: "Every-
one may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no con-
stitutional right to be a policeman." 21 Such a simple rule, however, does
not deal with the dangers involved in empowering a single group to de-
clare which organizations are deemed to be subversive. Some state legisla-
tion provides that the list of subversive organizations compiled by the
Attorney General of the United States shall be used as the criterion to
be applied by the courts and investigating bodies when questioning the
group affiliations of government employees.22 Such listings may prove
to be very dangerous if used as a conclusive determination of improper
conduct on the part of government employees who are or have been
members of such listed groups. Condemnation of the retrospective loyalty
oaths and this method of determining which organizations are subversive
bases its validity on the protection of the rights of the innocent. History
will point out the ease with which political opponents of those in authori-
ty and minorities holding contrary views may be condemned by capri-
cious and arbitrary action.23
In the evolution of loyalty oaths, the presumption of scienter as found
in the Feinberg Law 24 became a conclusive presumption of disloyalty in
the Oklahoma loyalty statute which prescribed such oaths for all state
officers and employees. 25 Thus the rule of scienter, promulgated by the
highest court of the land, was disregarded, and guilt by association be-
came the dictate in at least one state. The simple rule expressed time and
again in upholding oppressive legislation against public employees-that
such legislation does not violate constitutional due process because no
person has a right to hold a government job 26-was used again in this
present-day threat, but with a more harmful effect than ever before.
The United States Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision,27 held that
20 N.Y. Education Law (McKinney, 1947), S 3021-22 (Feinberg Law). Thompson
v. Wallin, 301 N.Y. 476, 95 N.E. 2d 806 (1950); 51 Col. L. Rev. 587 (1951).
21 McAuliffe v. New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
22 1 Deering Calif. Code, Govt. 188, § 3103 (1951).
23 The Federalist, No. 43 (Madison). As to the requirement of notice and hear-
ing in accordance with constitutional due process before the Attorney General could
list an organization as subversive, see Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S.
123 (1951).
24 N.Y. Educ. Law (McKinney, 1947), S 3021-22 (Feinberg Act).
25 Okla. Stat. (1951) Title 51, S 37.1-37.8.
2 6 People v. Crane, 214 N.Y. 154, 108 N.E. 427 (1915); Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S.
175 (1915).
27 Justice Jackson not participating.
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a statute which barred individuals from employment solely on the basis
of organizational membership, regardless of their knowledge concerning
the organizations to which they belonged, violates the due process clause
of the federal Constitution. In holding this statute unconstitutional the
Supreme Court demonstrated that it will uphold the statute of one state
while holding an identical statute of another state invalid, depending upon
the interpretation and application given to the statute by the state court.
The wording of the Oklahoma statute was practically identical28 with
the loyalty oath statute of California,2 9 which has been upheld as con-
stitutional by the United States Supreme Court.30 The California statute
was interpreted by the state supreme court to apply only to those in-
dividuals who joined subversive organizations knowing of their subversive
activities. The Oklahoma Supreme Court interpreted their statute as not
to imply scienter. 31 It was applied to those who had no knowledge of the
subversive character of the organizations in which they became members.
In holding the Oklahoma statute unconstitutional the Supreme Court
reasoned that one might join a proscribed organization while unaware
of its subversive activities.
They had joined (but) did not know what it was; they were good, fine
young men and women, loyal Americans, but they had been trapped into
it-because one of the great weaknesses of all Americans, whether adult or
youth, is to join something.3 2
The indiscriminate classification of innocent members with guilty mem-
bers of subversive organizations is both unjust and an assertion of arbitra-
ry power.33 Notwithstanding the edict that no one has a right to a gov-
ernment job, the Court has held that constitutional protection does ex-
tend to the public servant where exclusion pursuant to a statute is patent-
ly arbitrary or discriminatory. Legislatures cannot "enact a regulation
providing that no Republican, Jew, or Negro shall be appointed to
federal office. . ...134
The analogy between the actus non reum facit, sed miens-the criminal
act plus intention necessary to constitute any common law crime 3'-and
the Supreme Court's edict that membership in a subversive organization,
28 Okla. Stat. (1950) Title 51, § 37.1-37.8.
29 1 Deering Calif. Code, Govt. 188, S 3103 (1951).
36 Gamer v. Los Angeles Board, 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
31 Wieman v. Updegraff, 75 S. Ct. 215 (1952).
32Testimony of J. Edgar Hoover, hearings before House Committee on Un-
American Activities on H.R. 2122, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 46.
8 3 Wieman v. Updegraff, 75 S. Ct. 215, 219 (1952).
34 United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 100 (1947).
35People v. Fernow, 286 Il. 627, 122 N.E. 155 (1919); Kilbourne v. State, 84 Ohio
St. 477, 95 N.E. 824 (1911); Mills v. State, 58 Fla. 74, 51 So. 278 (1910).
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along with knowledge of the organization's true purpose, is necessary
before a teacher may be barred from public employ, is well justified, and
the question warrants its further application. Perhaps such decision is a
tacit recognition by the Court that the barring of teachers from public
employment, though such employment is a privilege and not a right, is
still a type of punishment. One may still recognize the right of the state
to impose qualifications upon the exercise of various callings or privileges,
but it should be emphasized that the state cannot be permitted, under
guise of fixing qualifications, to inflict punishment for a past act not
punishable at the time it was committed.3 6
It is true that in a time of "cold war and hot emotions when 'each
man begins to eye his neighbor as a possible enemy' ,,3" it is difficult to
evaluate rational arguments for and against the legality of retrospective
loyalty oaths, when interwoven with those arising from hot blood and
passionate defenses of our personal liberty. When this is further confusei
by judicial comment upon the wisdom and effectiveness of legislative
action, we have anything but a scholarly decision which may act as
precedent for future cases.
It is time for the courts to analyze the differences between the cases
and to distinguish between legislation enacted to protect our government
from subversives and that the function of which is to guarantee that fit
teachers be employed in our school systems. More arbitrary provisions
are justifiable when applied to classified projects, such as the Atomic
Bomb Project, in which a high degree of secrecy is needed. A reasonable
suspicion of disloyalty should be sufficient to preclude any person frmm
entering such service, while in other divisions of public employment,
lesser safeguards should be required. Lack of such analysis may be The
reason why the Supreme Court has rendered seemingly contradictc v
decisions in separate cases involving loyalty programs.38
Even though the decision in Wieman v. Updegraff39 was a step in the
right direction, the "decision" was rendered perhaps with the wrong
reason or no reason at all appearing in the opinions. An example of the
language used throughout the various opinions is: "Test oaths are notori-
ous tools of tyranny. When used to shackle the mind, they are, or at least
they should be, unspeakably odious to a free people." 40 This is strong
36Note 9 supra; Cf. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946), reaffir red
Cummings doctrine.
37 Wieman v. Updegraff, 73 S. Ct. 215, 219 (1952).
38 In reference to the contradictory holdings in Bailey v. Richard'n:.,, 341 U..S
918 (1951), and Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (195i), see .',
Annual Surv. Am. L., pp. 84-89, pp. 129-135.
39 73 S. Ct. 215 (1952).
40 Ibid at 220.
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and poetic language, but it fails to present legal grounds for invalidating
the present legislation.
Worthy of quotation are these words voiced by Justice Miller in 1868:
All oaths of an expurgatory character, especially when applied as a means
of punishment for past acts not at the time recognized and known to the
law as penal or criminal, have been regarded in all countries in modern times
as odious and inquisitorial, and passed, as they usually are, in times of high
excitement, upon the return of cool judgment and calm reason have been
condemned and repealed .... 41
If the time for cool judgment is returning, the people are looking to the
Supreme Court of the United States to safeguard and protect their civil
liberties in the exercise of its function as the supreme interpreter of the
Constitution. Scholarly decisions, based upon sound theories of juris-
prudence, are the bases upon which all adjudications involving our funda-
mental rights must be predicated.
41 Green v. Shumway, 39 N.Y. 418 (1868).
